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ABSTRACT
It has frequently been suggested that a high degree of social hetero-
geneity is conducive to a high rate of crime. This paper explores that hypothe-
sis by providing an explicit statistical test of the relationship between a
society's homicide rate and various measures of the ethnic, linguistic, reli-
gious, and economic heterogeneity of that society's population, using nation-
states as units of observation. The results lend support to the theory that the
interaction within a society of heterogeneous cultural groups tends to increase
the rate of homicide. The empirical analysis controls for the effect on homicide
rates of the age structure of the population, per capita GNP, urbanization, and
population density; the results suggest that the first two of these factors are
also important in explaining variations in homicide rates.
Rates of crime, particularly rates of violent crime, vary enormously among
nations. In the popular mind such varying rates of crime are commonly
attributed to relative differences in the heterogeneity of population.1 In-
formal arguments to this effect have also been advanced by several re-
searchers. For example, in comparing Japan's low crime rate to that of the
United States, Bayley suggested that the substantial cultural homogeneity
of the Japanese population has helped to establish a moral consensus in
Japanese society, which in turn has enhanced the effectiveness of both
formal and informal authority. Likewise Porterfield (b), commenting on
crime in Finland, emphasized the considerable ethnic diversity of the na-
tion's population. He concluded that, because of the stress that it creates,
"this heterogeneity may well account for the fact that the nation as a whole
has a higher than average rate of both suicide and homicide" (173).
*Prepared under Grant #75-NI-99-0127 from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice, and by
a grant from the Sloan Foundation. This paper benefited from the comments of David H.
Bayley, Wendell Bell, James Q. Wilson, Marvin E. Wolfgang, and the members of the Berkeley
Demography Workshop. Research assistance was provided by James Trask and Michael
Woodford. The usual caveats apply.
0 1982 The University of North Carolina Press. 0037-7732/82/010206-24501.90
206
Sociogenesis of Homicide / 207
Several statistical analyses using United States data claim to estab-
lish a relationship between crime rates and the heterogeneity of local
populations. For example, Porterfield (a) computed a correlation of .53
between statewide average data on serious crimes and an index of homo-
geneity for each state (defined as the sum of the percent deviations from
the national average in the proportion of individuals in the state who
(a) had changed their county of residence within the previous five years
and (b) were "others than native whites"). He concluded that this correla-
tion supports the hypothesis that heterogeneity is a measure of "social
disorganization and cultural differentiation," and that these factors in turn
influence the crime rate.
In a similar study of 112 metropolitan areas in the United States,
Angell (a) found a correlation coefficient of .35 between a composite crime
index and an index of the "heterogeneity of the population," constructed
by adding the fraction of foreign-born whites to twice the fraction of
nonwhites. Angell took the crime rate to be an index of the moral integra-
tion of the city, and interpreted his results as support for the hypothesis
that greater heterogeneity has a deleterious effect on moral integration.
(See also Angell, b.)
Both the Porterfield and Angell studies are subject to the criticism,
among other objections, that their heterogeneity indices are in consider-
able part simply measures of the size of the nonwhite population. Conse-
quently Lander's analysis of the incidence of juvenile delinquency among
census tracts in Baltimore has special interest. Lander found that the rate of
delinquency for both whites and blacks increased as the percentage of
blacks in the area rose from 0 to about 50 percent, and then decreased as
the percentage of blacks rose from 50 to 100 percent. Lander concluded
that "[aireas of maximum racial heterogeneity are characterized by the
largest extent of social instability and anomie" (83). Subsequently, how-
ever, Bordua was unable to replicate this result using data from Detroit.
Cross-national data have been employed in one study, by McDon-
ald, which includes an investigation of the relationship between popula-
tion heterogeneity and criminal activity across a sample of 40 nationstates.
Based on separate trivariate regressions, each relating homicide rates to
one or another single measure of racial, religious, or linguistic hetero-
geneity, McDonald inferred that: "Murder rates were higher in societies
that were heterogeneous with respect to language, though neither reli-
gious nor racial heterogeneity had any effect" (173). In similar regressions
using indices for crime other than homicide, none of the heterogeneity
measures showed up as significant. McDonald argued that his results
negate "social problems explanations" of crime: "Indicators of hetero-
geneity in the population, thought both to cause problems and to make
their solution more cumbersome, completely failed to have the predicted
effect in the main data set" (175). In McDonald's study, however, hetero-
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geneity is represented merely by a dummy variable with a value of one if
an arbitrary fraction of the population (80 percent for religion, 85 percent
for language, 90 percent for race) shared a common religion, language, or
racial identity. Moreover, the study does not explore the joint influence of
different heterogeneity measures, however defined, upon criminal activity
-an omission that, as suggested below, may make McDonald's results
seriously misleading.
None of these authors gives a precise account of the social mecha-
nisms that might link population heterogeneity to criminal activity. Several
theories are, however, suggested by their observations or by the various
comments that they offer concerning causal relationships.
The most straightforward theory is simply that people are inclined
to feel antagonistic to, and to act abusively toward, others who are physio-
logically or culturally different from themselves. Blau has in fact employed
such logic as the basis for a theoretical prediction that heterogeneity will
breed interpersonal conflict, including crime. Such a theory, however, is
inconsistent with the fact that the great bulk of crime, especially violent
crime, is evidently intra-group, even in heterogeneous societies. For ex-
ample, Wolfgang's study (b) of homicide in Philadelphia showed that
94 percent of all homicides were intra-racial, and Garfinkel's study of
North Carolina homicides found that 90 percent were intra-racial. It ap-
pears, then, that any social or psychological theory linking heterogeneity
to crime must demonstrate a mechanism whereby an increase in the num-
ber of groups in a society leads to a higher crime rate within each group.
One such mechanism might be inferred from psychological theories
of displaced aggression (Brown; Buss; Dolard et al.; Fenigstein and Buss;
Holmes; Konecni and Doob). While individuals may be inclined to feel
aggressive toward others who are culturally or physiologically different,
that aggression may in fact often be taken out on members of the indi-
vidual's own group, who tend to be more accessible. Further, such behavior
might be aggravated by a tendency for socioeconomic classes to appear
particularly rigid in the presence of obvious cultural or physiological dif-
ferences among social groups. Members of the lowest-status groups in
society might feel that their opportunities for social mobility are especially
restricted when upper-class persons are obviously and identifiably differ-
ent from themselves, and the resulting frustration could lead to an unusu-
ally high incidence of criminal behavior.
A rather different theory is that group norms and sanctions tend to
break down in the presence of conflicting cultures. Thus, as Bayley notes
in his observations on Japan, collective mechanisms for maintaining order
-such as criminal statutes, the courts, and the police-may receive greater
respect and cooperation from the citizenry at large if there is a strong
consensus as to the means and ends of law enforcement and if all citizens
identify strongly with the particular individuals who are charged with en-
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forcing the law. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, it seems plausible
that the informal mechanisms for maintaining order within a given cultural
group could become weakened through contact with other groups. The
moral authority of one's own culture, and of the types of sanctions that
support it, may lose some of their strength when one is continually ex-
posed to other cultures. Likewise, an individual's respect for himself and
for other members of his group may be diminished by contact with those
who are different-and who may even be perceived 'as superior-cultur-
ally, racially, or economically. The result could be a weakening of group
norms as a whole-including those, such as disapproval of violence and
theft, that are largely shared by all of the groups involved. 2
Reasoning of this sort is suggested, explicitly or implicitly, by some
of those who see culture conflict as an important source of crime (Mc-
Donald; Sellin). 3 Such a tendency toward normlessness in heterogeneous
environments is also invoked more or less clearly by Lander (89) and,
as he notes, it is at least arguably consistent with Durkheim's theory of
anomie 4 (89).
Most discussions of the relationship between population hetero-
geneity and crime seem premised on the implicit assumption that hetero-
geneity is a unitary phenomenon. In fact, however, there are many differ-
ent dimensions in which a society can be heterogeneous, and it is not
obvious that each of these types of heterogeneity should bear the same
relationship to levels of criminal activity. Racial, religious, and linguistic
heterogeneity might, for example, have quite different effects on crime
rates. Indeed, it is plausible a priori that at least some forms of population
heterogeneity might have a negative effect on criminal activity. Linguistic
heterogeneity might, for example, tend to reduce contact between popula-
tion subgroups that are heterogeneous in other dimensions (such as race
or religion), and consequently mitigate tensions that would otherwise
arise from the interaction of those subgroups. (For further discussion, see
below.)s
Somewhat surprisingly-in light of the considerable theorizing and
the suggestive though limited empirical observations that have appeared-
there is nowhere in the literature a detailed rigorous statistical test of the
relationship between population heterogeneity and criminal activity within
or between societies. The remainder of this paper provides such a test and
an interpretation of the results.
The Statistical Model
A general hypothesis about the effect of population heterogeneity (a vector
H) on criminal activity (C) may be described as
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C = f(H;O) (1)
where 0 refers to other relevant factors, presumably held constant.
Clearly, a persuasive statistical test of the general hypothesis re-
quires that other factors be held constant in some convincing way. One
strategy would be to rely on repeated observations on a single society,
fixing on the dynamic, albeit short run, relationship between heterogeneity
and criminal activity. Another strategy would rely on cross-sectional ob-
servations from different societies, and thus would focus attention on the
static, but long run, relationship between criminal activity and hetero-
geneity. The former strategy would exploit data containing less varia-
tion and would require careful attention to exogenous, time varying phe-
nomena (see, e.g., Wolpin). The latter strategy, based on data containing
more variation, would be more prone to measurement error; for this
reason alone we would expect the proportion of explained variation to be
lower when based on cross-sectional data.
The analysis reported below is based on data for some 58 nation-
states. 6 At present it does not appear that sufficient time series information
exists, even for developed nations, to support a meaningful dynamic
analysis.
A test of the general hypothesis requires specification and measure-
ment of criminal activity, heterogeneity, and other factors, as well as the
functional form (f[.;.1) of the relationship.
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
This analysis deals exclusively with the rate of homicide, or purposely
inflicted deaths, as a measure of criminal activity (C). The principal reasons
for this are: (1) among all crimes, homicide appears to vary least in defini-
tion from one society to the next (Ferdinand; Hindelang; Wolfgang, a);
(2) homicide statistics are probably more reliable than other crime statistics
for most societies, owing to the serious nature of the crime and the likeli-
hood that it will come to the attention of the authorities (Clinard and
Abbott; Mulvihill and Tumin); (3) data on homicide are available for a
wider range of societies than are data on other crimes; and (4) homicide
seems less likely to arise directly from rational profit-maximizing motives
than crimes against property (Becker).
Average annual homicide rates were obtained for a sample of 58
nations. The figures include not just criminal homicides, but all deaths
purposely inflicted by other persons and by the state, except for deaths
related to acts of warfare. Such a broad measure has a major advantage
in comparing incidence across societies: it is independent of differences
among societies in the definition of excusable homicide. This also means,
however, that these homicide rates cannot be interpreted as a precise
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measure of those purposely inflicted deaths actually considered criminal
by the societies involved.
Although the accuracy, and in some cases the definition, of these
homicide rates undoubtedly varies from one nation to the next, for the
limited purposes of this analysis we do not require that homicide rates be
reported without error; it is sufficient simply that any errors in the homi-
cide rates be uncorrelated with the heterogeneity measures and other
variables discussed below. It is difficult to establish whether this condition
is met by this (or any other) body of data. Errors in reporting homicide
rates may be truly random. Under these circumstances the variance of the
stochastic error term would be needlessly high, but neither its expected
value nor its variance would vary with other factors. Alternatively, it may
well be that the accuracy of reported homicide rates varies positively with
levels of modernization and development, and that the level of consistency
of definition with the United Nations definition of homicide (which the
data purportedly follow in most cases) also varies positively with these
factors. Under these latter circumstances, the variance of the stochastic
error term, but not its expected value, would vary inversely with measures
of economic development or modernization.
Under either the former or latter conditions, errors in homicide rates
would be uncorrelated with the other variables in the model, and coeffi-
cient estimates would be unbiased, though inefficient. Thus any formal
test of the statistical significance of heterogeneity upon crime would be
more conservative-formal tests would be biased towards accepting the
null hypothesis of no relation between homicide rates and heterogeneity
(Hanushek and Jackson). It is certainly possible to imagine situations
where the error terms would be correlated with other factors included in
the model and where, as a result, coefficient estimates would be biased
and inconsistent. We have no direct evidence on the issue. In any case,
while we suspect that the accuracy and consistency of measurement varies
across societies according to their level of development, we have no a priori
reason to suspect that the expected values of the errors is correlated with
the explanatory variables discussed below.
HETEROGENEITY
We have constructed four measures of the economic, cultural, and social
heterogeneity of societies. These include measures of the heterogeneity of
income, language, ethnicity, and religion within each country.
Heterogeneity in income (a cardinal scale with a well-defined zero
point, in contrast to language, religion, and ethnicity) was measured by
the Gini coefficient. This index has an extreme value of zero if incomes are
perfectly equal for all individuals; larger values (bounded by one) signify
greater inequality or heterogeneity in income.
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Measures of the heterogeneity of language, ethnicity, and religion
for each country were constructed using entropy indices (see Theil). The
entropy index for religion, for example, was computed from the proportion
of the population (pi) belonging to each major religion i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
The entropy measure of religious heterogeneity, HR, is
N
HR = Ypilogp1 . (2)
If everyone in the society is a member of the same religion (p,=l), then the
index takes the value zero. Higher values correspond to a more hetero-
geneous population. For a society with adherents to M religions, the index
is at a maximum when the population is equally divided among those
religions. Likewise, the index is higher for a population equally divided
among M religions than it is for a population equally divided among M -1
religions. (See Allison for a detailed discussion.)
Neither the Gini index nor the entropy index is a unique measure of
heterogeneity. However, the Gini coefficient has the desirable properties of
symmetry and scale invariance in measuring inequality along a cardinal
scale such as income. Moreover, for discrete categories such as religion,
ethnicity, or language, the entropy index is the only measure of hetero-
geneity with the properties of continuity, symmetry, and additivity (Alli-
son; Theil).
7
Entropy measures of the religious, ethnic, and linguistic hetero-
geneity of each country were computed by classifying the population of
each country in terms of eight major religions, more than a hundred
principal languages spoken, and more than a hundred possible ethnic
backgrounds.
Strictly interpreted, the validity of the entropy measures used here
depends on the prior classification of populations into categories that are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and that are also equally distant from
each other. The latter criterion would be met for the linguistic categories,
for example, if speakers of one language could never understand speakers
of another. Breaking down all languages further into dialects, on the other
hand, would cause a society divided equally among speakers of two dia-
lects of the same language to rank the same on the heterogeneity index as
a society divided equally among speakers of one of those dialects and
speakers of an entirely different language.
In defining categories for the entropy indices we have made no
effort to second-guess the sources of our linguistic and ethnic data (which
come largely from the cross-national data files assembled by Taylor and
Hudson), but rather have taken the data as we found them. Whatever the
potential defects of the categorizations that underlie the heterogeneity
indices, all categories have been applied consistently from one country to
the next. That is, the indices are based on objective measures of ethnicity,
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language, and religion that are independent of national context. 8 Other-
wise the indices would be measures not just of objective heterogeneity, but
also of those factors that cause the population of one nation to create, or
perhaps just to perceive, important distinctions between population sub-
groups where another nation does not. In the latter case, a positive correla-
tion between (apparent) diversity and crime could simply reflect a high
correlation between a nation's crime rate and the sensitivity of its citizens to
various genetic and cultural differences found among themselves.
OTHER VARIABLES
We also obtained measures of several other social, economic, and demo-
graphic factors, primarily to serve as controls on the tests of the hetero-
geneity hypothesis, but also because their relationship to homicide rates is
of interest in its own right. These variables include population density, a
measure of urbanization (the percentage of the population living in cities
larger than 100,000), gross national product per capita, and the percentage
of the population between 15 and 25 years of age.
It was possible to obtain all these data for a sample of 58 nations,
with the exception of the Gini coefficient measuring income inequality,
which was available for a subset of only 40 nations. Table 1 provides
summary information on the variables collected for the 40 nation sample
and for the 58 nation sample. The annual homicide rate for these samples
is about 5 per 100,000, with a standard deviation of 6. There is considerable
variation in the measures of religious, ethnic, and linguistic heterogeneity;
heterogeneity of income varies somewhat less. It should be noted that the
ethnic and religious entropy measures are highly correlated, at about .8,
in each sample. This, of course, does not affect the expected value of co-
efficient estimates, but, as noted below, results require a judicious inter-
pretation.
Results
Table 2 presents ordinary least-squares regression estimates of equa-
tion (1) in six variants. Each variant includes the estimated coefficients of
the measures of religious, ethnic, and linguistic heterogeneity. The (un-
standardized) coefficients are interpreted as the effect of a one unit change
in each variable on the homicide rate, holding other variables constant. For
the larger sample of 58 nations, three regressions are presented: the first
includes only the three measures of heterogeneity; the second includes the
variable reflecting the youthful population; the third also includes the
measures of population density, urbanization, and per capita income. For
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Table 2. ORDINARY LEAST-SQUARES REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS* (DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
HOMICIDE RATE PER 100,000)
58 Countries 40 Countries
Variant (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heterogeneity
Religion -5.53 -4.42 -3.51 -4.70 -3.79 -3.37
(2.1) (1.9) (1.3) (1.4) (1.2) (0.9)
Ethnicity 6.14 4.95 4.61 3.93 3.79 3.49
(2.6) (2.4) (2.1) (1.3) (1.3) (.1)
Language -5.85 -5.83 -6.11 -3.85 -4.39 -4.96
(2.1) (2.3) (2.4) (.) (1.3) (1.4)
Income 25.83 14.32 12.80
(2.1) (.) (0.9)
Other Variables
Youth (7% pop. ages 15-24) 1.73 1.40 1.40 1.02
(3.9) (2.7) (2.0) (.3)
GNP per capita (thousands
of U.S. dollars) -1.34 -0.98
(1.2) (0.6)
Density (thousands of -0.14 0.82
persons/kn
2
) . (0.) (0.)
Urbanization (% pop. In -0.02 -0.5
cities over 100,000) (0.6) (0.6)
Constant 5.68 -23.12 -15.56 -4.86 -23.73 -14.04
(4.5) (3.1) (1.7) (0.9) (2.2) (0.1)
R2  .14 .34 .37 .23 .32 .35
Degrees of freedom 54 53 50 35 34 31
F-ratio** 3.0 2.2 2.4 2.7 1.3 1.5
*t-ratios for the hypothesis that each coefficient is insignificant are shown in paren-
theses. For a one tailed test t . 13, t 0 5 =1.7; for a two tailed test t .7,
t.5 = 2.0.
**Each F-ratio presented is for the hypothesis that the measures of heterogeneity are
jointly insignificant. For the 6 columns of the table F.10 =2.1; F.05=2.7.
the smaller sample of 40 nations, where a measure of economic hetero-
geneity is also available, the table presents similar regression estimates.
The table also reports the t-ratio for each estimated coefficient.
As Table 2 indicates, the indices of religious, ethnic and linguistic
heterogeneity retain the same sign and similar magnitudes in all six regres-
sions. In the first three regressions, the coefficients of these indices are
each significantly different from zero at greater than the .10 level. In
regression (4), when the income inequality measure is added and the size
of the sample is reduced to 40 observations, the measures of heterogeneity
remain significant when taken as a group. Even with this reduced sample,
however, the measure of income inequality is highly significant. Finally, in
216 / Social Forces Volume 61:1, September 1982
regressions (5) and (6), with the other variables added, we can no longer
clearly establish that the heterogeneity measures are significant. These
simple regressions explain between 14 and 37 percent of the variance in
homicide rates across the different samples.
As noted in Table 1, the measures of ethnic and linguistic hetero-
geneity are highly correlated in both samples. One implication of this
collinearity is that it is difficult, statistically speaking, to estimate the
separate effects of these two influences upon homicide rates. The coeffi-
cients reported in Table 2 are of course unbiased, but imprecise. For this
reason, the F-ratio for the set of heterogeneity measures is reported for
each specification of the model. The F-ratio tests the hypothesis that the
heterogeneity measures as a group are significantly different from zero,
regardless of the correlations among them. For the larger sample of coun-
tries, the hypothesis that heterogeneity is not associated with increased
homicide is rejected at the .10 level or greater. When the size of the sample
is reduced to 40 countries and the Gini coefficient is added (equation 4),
heterogeneity of population is still significantly related to homicide.
Multiplicative (semi log and double log) specifications of the rela-
tionship (not shown) yielded the same qualitative results. The coefficients
of the heterogeneity measures were stable across alternative specifications,
and the pattern of statistical results was similar.
As an illustration of the effect of heterogeneity upon homicide,
Table 3 compares the homicide rate of the United States with the rates
found in two other industrialized democracies, Sweden and Japan, that are
conspicuously more homogeneous in terms of language, religion, and
ethnicity. It also presents the differences in rates for these countries that
are predicted from the data in our sample using the coefficients from
regression (4) in Table 2. As the table indicates, the homicide rate in the
United States exceeds the rate in Japan (Sweden) by about 6.7 (7.1) homi-
cides per hundred thousand. In part, these observed differences in homi-
cide rates are attributable to the substantial differences in religious, ethnic,
Table. COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND PREDICTED DIFFERENCES IN HOMICIDE RATES FOR
THREE COUNTRIES
Actual Differences In Homicide
Rates (per 100,000 population)
Pred icted D ifferences




*Predictions derived from Table 2, regression (4).
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linguistic, and economic heterogeneity among these countries. For ex-
ample, increased heterogeneity of the U.S. population relative to Japan is
associated with a predicted difference in homicide rate of 2.4 per hundred
thousand. Heterogeneity accounts for about 35 percent of the difference in
the homicide rates between Japan and the United States, and more than 40
percent of the difference in homicide rates between Sweden and the
United States.
Interpretations
The foregoing results suggest that, while differences among nations in
homicide rates can by no means be attributed entirely to differences in
population heterogeneity, nevertheless there is a significant, if complex,
relationship between homicide rates and measures of heterogeneity.
These results cannot, of course, be considered a test of any particular
theoretical model. We have not presented a well-formulated theory linking
homicide to population heterogeneity, much less specific postulates from
which the functional forms for the regression estimates are derived. Never-
theless it is possible to theorize about the causal factors underlying these
results.
CULTURE CONFLICT
One striking result, consistent across all estimated regressions, is that
homicide rates are positively related to ethnic heterogeneity but negatively
related to linguistic (and, to a lesser degree, religious) heterogeneity. This
might seem puzzling, since the population subgroupings that underlie
both of these indices are roughly similar. Indeed, as we have noted, the
measures of these two aspects of population heterogeneity are highly
correlated in both of our samples. Thus, on empirical grounds, these
indices might well be assumed to measure a single construct-ethno-
linguistic fractionalization. Apart from statistical reasons, then, why should
the indices have different signs in multiple regressions?
There is a plausible theoretical interpretation, consistent with the
conflict-of-cultures theory of deviance discussed at the beginning. When
cultural and/or ethnic groups within a nation's population have different
languages, contact between members of those groups is less likely. Thus
the cultural experience of a typical member of one of these groups will be
more homogeneous. Only when members of different ethnic groups share
a common language are they likely to have much intercourse, and only
then is there likely to be much exposure to norms, sanctions, and patterns
of authority that differ from, and hence might tend to weaken the hold of,
those of one's own group. Consequently, if such mutual erosion of conflict-
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ing cultures is important in affecting rates of homicide, we should not be
surprised to find that ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity have opposite
signs when both variables are accounted for simultaneously.
A similar explanation may underlie the negative effect attributed to
religious heterogeneity. Members of different religious groups tend to live
apart, attend different schools, and so forth; holding constant the level of
ethnic diversity, the higher the level of religious diversity the lower the
level of intergroup contact. One would expect that this isolating effect
would be less marked, however, for religious differences than for linguistic
differences, and in fact our results show a stronger negative relationship
between homicide and linguistic diversity than between homicide and
religious diversity.9
DISPLACED AGGRESSION
Arguably these results are, by somewhat similar logic, also consistent with
a displaced aggression theory of homicide. Thus, it might be that the
degree of (displaced) aggression that an individual feels toward members
of a different group (but which he takes out on members of his own group)
is directly related to the degree of contact that he has with that other
group, and that such contact is reduced if the other group has a different
language or religion from his own. This interpretation seems somewhat
less persuasive than the culture conflict interpretation suggested above,
however, since casual observation suggests that linguistic and, especially,
religious distinctions are among the types of inter-group differences that
lead most strongly to inter-group hostility (and thus, presumably, by
extension to displaced aggression that is intra-group).
A DURKHEIMIAN INTERPRETATION
A rather different, Durkheimian interpretation is also available. In Suicide,
Durkheim speculates briefly on the social factors that are conducive to
homicide. He suggests that homicide is likely to be most common where
social regulation (the extent to which collective morals and authority effec-
tively constrain the means used by individuals to achieve their personal
goals) is weak. While Durkheim does not address the point directly, it
could be argued, consistently with the discussion of culture conflict above,
that ethnic diversity does lead to a breakdown in the social consensus
supporting collective authority. Different groups will have differing norms
and, perhaps more importantly, differing ideas about such institutions as
marriage, the family, schools, and the criminal justice system, appropriate
for imposing and enforcing those norms.
But Durkheim also suggests that high rates of homicide are likely to
correspond to a high degree of social integration (the extent to which
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collective consciousness dominates individual consciousness, i.e., the ex-
tent to which peoples' desires and beliefs are given to them by the group to
which they belong instead of being largely personal in origin, or individu-
ated). A high level of integration fosters low respect for the value of any
single individual and his interests, and simultaneously leads to strong
social passions. "[N]o soil is so favorable to the development of the specifi-
cally homicidal passions," Durkheim argues (356), and he notes in this
connection that intensity of religious faith can be an important element of
integration. Thus one could argue-though Durkheim himself does not-
that religious heterogeneity within a given society tends to break down
such religious integration, and hence acts as a deterrent to homicide.10
Linguistic diversity could have a similar effect, for when subgroups cannot
communicate, development of a "collective consciousness" will necessarily
be impeded.
We do not wish to suggest that we find this rationalization particu-
larly compelling, nor do we wish to impute undue clarity or coherence to
Durkheim's conceptual scheme. Rather, we wish simply to emphasize that,
even if we confine ourselves to the existing literature, alternative theories
are consistent with our results."
INCOME
The positive correlation between income inequality and homicide is con-
sistent with the conventional belief that economic frustration and relative
poverty tend to breed crime. The inverse relationship between homicide
and per capita GNP suggests that absolute poverty is also conducive to
crime.1 2
URBANIZATION
The relationship between urbanization and crime has been the subject of
an extensive literature (see Archer and Gartner for a survey). Empirical
studies have shown that the homicide rate for large cities within any given
country generally exceeds the homicide rate for the country as a whole,
and that the homicide rate for large cities generally exceeds the rate for
smaller cities within the same country (e.g., Archer and Gartner).1 3 One
might be tempted to infer from these studies that, in general, the more
urbanized a country is, the higher will be its homicide rate. Yet our re-
sults-which show no significant relationship, once other variables are
controlled for-suggest otherwise.14
However, our results do not necessarily conflict with the earlier
studies; several theories are consistent with both sets of findings. For
example, the conditions of city life may have no causal influence on homi-
cide; instead, an unusual proportion of a society's homicides may simply
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take place in cities, perhaps because cities tend to attract those who are
most likely to be homicidal. Alternatively, even if city life is conducive
to higher rates of homicide, other changes in society associated with
the developmental process that gives rise to urbanization may tend to
lower a society's overall homicide rate, cancelling out any effects of city
growth per se.
AGE STRUCTURE
The strong positive correlation between homicide rates and the percentage
of the population between 15 and 25 years of age is consistent with figures
for the U.S. showing that homicide, like most other crime, is committed
disproportionately by the young (Wolfgang, b). Indeed, these results sug-
gest that differences in age structure account for more of the variation
among countries in homicide rates than the three social heterogeneity
measures (ethnicity, language, and religion) combined. 15
NEW SOCIETIES
If, for any of the regressions reported above, we allow the constant term to
vary according to whether a nation is in the Western Hemisphere, we find
that the constant term is significantly larger for the Western Hemisphere
nations. It is tempting to attribute at least part of this unexplained differ-
ence between homicide rates in the Western Hemisphere and those in the
rest of the world to a frontier effect. All of the Western Hemisphere na-
tions, after all, are relatively young societies, and all have been heavily
populated by immigrants who may well have been unusually indepen-
dent, aggressive, and materialistic, and who had to struggle to make their
way in the new land. But such an argument, at least on its face, is not
consistent with the markedly low rates of homicide to be found in Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.
Conclusions
One must necessarily be wary in drawing causal inferences from cross-
sectional studies, since such studies may fail to control for crucial factors.
Nevertheless, the results presented here provide some support for theories
suggesting that population heterogeneity is a significant causal factor in
homicide. On the other hand, these results suggest that the relationship
between homicide and heterogeneity is complex. It is evidently a mistake
to think of population heterogeneity as a unidimensional variable that has
a consistently positive correlation with homicide. Rather, when several
dimensions of heterogeneity are considered jointly, we find that some
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forms of heterogeneity seem conducive to homicide, while others work
against it. The significant underlying factor is evidently the degree of
actual interaction between differing cultural or ethnic groups. More closely
focused studies will be necessary to confirm this interpretation.
The results also provide evidence concerning other factors that
might influence crime rates. A low level of income per capita and a high
proportion of young people in the population are associated with high
levels of homicide, while urbanization and population density seem to
have no important effect.
Notes
1. A casual comment appearing in an article in the New York Times Magazine provides a good
example: "[The State of] Washington, with a relatively homogeneous population, has a low
crime rate, and Seattle is considered one of the nation's safest cities" (Nordheimer, 112).
2. A stylized example may clarify this notion. Suppose that two boys from different families
live in the same neighborhood. The family of one of the boys belongs to a cultural group in
which, so far as children are concerned, mothers are the primary source of moral authority
and discipline, while grandfathers are conventionally pleasant figures whose primary role is
to be indulgent and generous toward their grandchildren. The family of the other boy belongs
to a different group in which, in contrast, mothers are assigned a weak and subordinate role
and grandfathers serve as the ultimate source of moral authority within the family. Prolonged
association between the boys might lead the first boy to discover that mothers are not univer-
sally respected and obeyed, and thus to lose some of his respect for the authority of his own
mother, while the second boy might undergo a similar change of attitude toward his grand-
father. The resulting damage to the authority systems in the two families might lead both boys
to become less disciplined in general.
3. Sellin also suggests that culturally heterogeneous societies may experience high crime rates
because the norms of the dominant group(s), which form the basis for the criminal law, pros-
cribe activity that is deemed permissible or even laudatory by the norms of other groups in the
society. Sellin's discussion of culture conflict as a cause of crime does not always distinguish
clearly between this theory and that which is outlined in the text.
4. A similar theory also seems to lie at the core of Lord Devlin's reasoning in his contribution
to the classic jurisprudential debate on the legal enforcement of morals.
5. Not all theorists, it should be noted, are convinced that there is a direct link of any sort be-
tween population heterogeneity and crime. For example, the subculture of violence view of
criminal behavior suggests that no simple relationship of this type should be expected
(Wolfgang and Ferracuti).
6. As discussed below, our analysis is based on two samples of data: one containing observa-
tions on 58 nations; and another containing observations on 40 nations. Details about the
specific definitions and sources of these data, as well as copies of the data sets, may be ob-
tained from the authors on request.
7. Other measures of diversity or heterogeneity have been proposed and widely used by
sociologists. Indeed, an alternative measure of heterogeneity, A, where
NA =1 - X p~2,
i=1
was proposed by Greenberg specifically to indicate linguistic diversity, was recommended by
Lieberson for the measurement of religious heterogeneity, and was used by Webb to measure
the division of labor (see also Bell; Goodman and Kruskal; Lieberson et al.). Another measure,
the "dissimilarity index," has been widely used by sociologists to quantify residential segrega-
tion (Taeuber and Taeuber).
A much cruder index of heterogeneity (e.g., a dummy variable signifying that at least
some arbitrary fraction of the population spoke a common lauguage) was employed by
McDonald.
In contrast to all these arbitrary measures, the entropy index can be easily aggregated
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or disaggregated. Compare, for example, the discussion of Lieberson with Theil. Compare
also the properties of the entropy index in the two-group case to the criticisms of dissimilarity
indices raised by Cortese et al. and the subsequent discussion by Taeuber and Taeuber and
Cohen et al.
8. For example, Basques, Catalans, and Galicians are all counted as separate ethnic groups
within the population of Spain. This same subcategorization is then applied to all other coun-
tries with significant subpopulations of Spanish origin, such as France and the Latin American
nations.
9. Note that our results suggest that McDonald's findings of no important relationship be-
tween heterogeneity and crime may be misleading. When, as in McDonald's study, only a
single index of heterogeneity is entered into any given regression, the coefficient assigned to
that index may be spuriously small and insignificant because the regression has attributed to
the index the effects due to other forms of heterogeneity that are positively correlated with
that index but that have an effect on crime rates that is opposite in direction to the effect actu-
ally caused by the form of heterogeneity represented by the index.
10. Indeed, at another point Durkheim suggests that, at least in some cases, religious faith be-
comes more intense when the religious group constitutes a minority within the nation.
11. Krohn uses cross-national data to test a rather differently formulated Durkheimian theory
of crime, and finds that the results fail to confirm that theory.
12. These cross-section results contrast with Wolpin's longitudinal studies showing positive
correlation between rates of violent crime and increases in GNP per capita for various devel-
oped countries.
13. In fact, Archer et al. find that, at least for the U.S., the positive correlation between city
size and homicide rate holds only for cities in excess of roughly 10,000 population; below that
level, city size appears to be inversely related to the homicide rate.
14. See also Krohn, reporting an ambiguous relationship between urbanization and crime, in-
cluding homicide, in a cross-national study. Krohn's results in this respect are difficult to
compare with ours because, among other things, he does not report tests of significance.
15. Forst, in a cross-section study of homicide using statewide observations from the United
States, does not find a significant age effect, but his sample contains too little variation in age
for this result to be very meaningful.
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